Kate Milberry

When Marcuse turned 70, his old Frankfurt School pal, Habermas, gave him an unusual present: an essay reworking the former’s notion of technology and science as “ideology”. I’m sure it was just what Marcuse always wanted.

Anyway. The article, creatively titled “Technology and science as ‘ideology’” unfolds after Habermas’ painfully dense fashion (what is with these German theoreticians!?). But after pecking away at it for awhile, I finally got into its groove. What he wants to say – and does so repeatedly – is that the so-called rationalization of society is intimately connected to the institutionalization of scientific and technical development. And this has dire implications for human liberation (or our continuing unfreedom). You’re thinking, yeah, whatever, what’s the newsflash? I’ll tell you:

Rationalization, following Weber, is the “disenchantment” of the world, the secularization of traditional worldviews. Sounds good so far. But the formal concept of rationality derives from purposive-rational action – that of the capitalist entrepreneur, the industrial wage earner, the modern bureaucrat. As such, it is not really “rationality” but a masked or unacknowledged political domination (says Marcuse). The structure of this rationality is oriented to technical control through subjugation of man and nature; the “rationalization” of the conditions of life is therefore equated to the institutionalization of a type of domination whose political nature is unrecognizable. Rationality is technical reason.

This kind of reason – oriented to control and domination and leading to unfreedom – is accepted by the masses, made palatable, due to the bourgeois ideologies of reciprocity and equality in the arena of economic exchange. In this bourgeois dream society, all are emancipated from domination and power is neutralized. But Marx’s labour theory of value destroyed the illusion of freedom and the root ideology of just exchange. It revealed that, in fact, the free labour contract obscured the relations of social force that underpinned the wage-labour relationship.

Habermas sets out to reformulate Weber’s concept of rationalization in order to discuss Marcuse’s critique of Weber, as well as his notion of the “double function” of scientific-technical progress – as both productive force and as ideology. What Weber tried to do with his concept of rationalization was understand how subsystems of purposive-rational action (the economy, the state) extended into societal institutions, and with what effect. Habermas proposes a new categorical framework to comprehend this phenomenon: the fundamental distinction b/w work (purposive-rational action) and interaction (communicative action). Purposive-rational action comprises both instrumental action (based on technical rules) and rational choice (governed by strategies based on analytic knowledge). Communicative action is symbolic interaction, and it’s governed by binding consensual norms.

We can distinguish social systems based on the type of action (or reason) that predominates. “The institutional framework of a society consists of norms that guide symbolic interaction. But there are subsystems… in which primarily sets of purposive-rational action are institutionalized” (93). In other (Habermasian) words, the lifeworld and the system confront one another in an ongoing struggle for supremacy. The passage from traditional society to modernity is marked by the continuous development of the productive forces, which causes the permanent encroachment of subsystems into the lifeworld of communicative action and interaction. The institutional framework of society thus adapts to the developing systems of purposive-rational action

The depoliticization of the masses must be achieved in order to legitimate this new society (where state intervention now compensates for the dysfunctions of the market). Marcuse says this will occur by having science and technology take on the role of an ideology; that is, by institutionalizing scientific-technical progress, causing people to lose consciousness of the dualism of work and interaction. Insidiously, it becomes a background ideology, penetrating into the consciousness of the depoliticized masses. “it is a singular achievement of this ideology to detach society’s self-understanding from the frame of reference of communicative action and from the concepts of symbolic interaction and replace it with a scientific model (105).

After a lot of writing, Habermas tells us that two concepts of rationalization must be distinguished. Rationalization at the level of subsystems of purposive-rational action, where scientific-technical progress can only be a liberatory force if it doesn’t replace rationalization at the level of the institutional framework. This kind of rationalization can occur only via symbolic interaction, by removing restrictions on communication. It must be public, unrestricted discussion, free from domination etc. etc. (You are thinking, correctly, of the public sphere and the theory of communicative action, two major Habermasian themes).

“The question is not whether we completely utilize an available or creatable potential, but whether we choose what we want for the purpose of the pacification and gratification of existence” (119).

Amen.

I know, there is a lot of sex-related spam to this blog and I need to do something about it soon. I will, I promise.

But in the mean time, I will tell you about my comprehensive exam. It went something like this:

i recieved 4 questions at 10 am. They appeared equallly difficult as I assessed the 48 hours before me. I figured it should break down, 50-50 (or 24h-24h).

I picked one question -almost at random. I had to pick something. It was the historical question:

“Outline the main developments in Marxist theory from Marx’s day down through Habermas, discussing Lukács, the Frankfurt school, and any other trend that you reviewed in the course of your reading.”

The answer to this question, I realized, was the justification for my exam, and I felt impelled to answer it, in order to answer myself.

And so I did, but it was *painfully* slow and long and belaboured. I looked EVERYTHING up, not leaving a thing to chance, and it took a long time. Hence, I encroached on the next 24h, earmarked soley for Question#2. What could I do? I was going as fast as I could. I got tired. I went to bed but couldn’t sleep. When I fell asleep, I awoke mere hours later (like 3). I thought it was time to get up, and did. After my shower, and boiling tea, it was 6:15am. I began.

I finished, I don’t know when, and began the next question:

“What advice can you give for the social activist of the twenty-first century that is consistent with or builds upon what you have read in these comp areas? In particular, what “emancipatory communication” strategies seem likely/possible and what would the practical steps necessary to create them, learning from the lessons of the 19th and 20th centuries?”

It was the only one (of the remaining 3) that allowed me to continue my first question (which I had not finished answering), using it as a rhetorical device. I felt clever (I know you’re reading this Richard).

Anyhoo, that question was much more creative, and dare I say fun, but I didn’t have quite enough time to answer it in the way I’d like. I finished at 1 am the 2nd day, and set my alarm for 6am the next. The exam was due at 10 am.

Upon waking, I wrote for 4 hours straight. No shower, no breakie. Just the me and the computer, locked in battle. Who would be triumphant? Unfortunately, I won’t know till September, after I write the next comp, and then defend both exams orally. But I’ll say this: it *was* an experience (Ted was right, natch). I accomplished something. I *did* it, whatever “it” is. I don’t agree with the pedagogical method of this exam – perhaps I’ll go more into it later. Suffice it to say, it’s more like an endurance test e.g. a marathon, than a proper test of academic ability. But I fucking did it. And I’ll do it again, only better.

But for now, I’m teaching. And studying. And thinking about summer (deadly). Right now, things are ok.

It’s been awhile since I’ve written here. I’m swearing a lot, and shaking my head, in that “tut tutting” manner of mother hens and busy bodies. I have little to no patience with the world. Things are fucked.

On another note, my first comprehensive exam (written) is in 2 weeks. This is the reason for my wracked emotional state. Not enough sleep, too much coffee. Too many children. Way too much stress. Will I be done? No. Yes. Who cares? Let’s write it and see. I could be the first person to fail this thing ever, or in a long time, in our department.

Things I know: 1. I don’t have a photographic memory. 2. I don’t speak well publicly under pressure.

That is a deadly combination for comps. If I believed in anything, I’d pray, but since I don’t, I feel oddly at peace with it all since there’s nothing beyond what I’m doing – nothing superhuman – that can help me. It’s just me. All me. And in the end, that’s all you’ve got for certain anyhow.

Below is my final (I think, hope) definitional essay of the first exam. In other words, this is supposed to map out and somewhat justify or explain the texts in my bibliography. Most people have this thing done way WAY a long time ago. Not 2 weeks before their exam. But who really fucking cares? See, I’m swearing. And now for some light reading…

Toward a theory of change: Radical social theory and emancipatory communication

This comprehensive exam considers radical social theory in its efforts to liberate humanity, particularly through communication. To this end, it investigates the history of thought that attempts to understand how human society is organized as well as articulate visions of progressive social change based on appeals to freedom, justice and equality. A recurring theme in this account is human oppression – the domination of (hu)man and nature that ensures the rule of a minority elite to the detriment of the masses. Radical social theory therefore comprises theoretical frameworks that are both sociological (analyzing “what is”) and philosophical (considering “what should be”) in an effort to realize the good, to create a better world. One of the critical components needed to foster this aspiration is communication.

This exam is guided by questions that take on an urgency in the contemporary era of perpetual war, increasing global human immiseration and ongoing ecological devastation. These questions are founded on notions of power, democracy, agency and – naïve though it may sound – ethics. Is another world possible, as the global justice movement proclaims? Can we reorganize society based on human need versus corporate greed? Can we collectively administrate our affairs without devolving into totalitarianism? Can we create a power structure that is networked, self-propelling and self-fulfilling? Can we build a sustainable and holistic social order that cares for people and the earth they derive life from? These questions have answers only in the social imagination, which is the basis for many of the texts on this exam. Before we build it, we must dream it.

The exam is divided into two subsections in order to clearly identify alternatives for social reorganization as well as the function of communication in achieving this; the first is organized historically, the second, thematically. Visions of a Liberated Society traces the lineage of socialist thought, beginning with pre-socialist utopian writings, following the evolution of socialist thought, and outlining recent progeny: post-Marxism, post-colonialism and feminism. The Enlightenment offers an obvious starting point, when ideas of progress, guided by reason instead of religion, began to be linked with ethics in examination of the individual, society and the state. Social theory emerges at about this time, with intense deliberations on inequality, the nature and limits of power in society and human liberty. One of the central debates that arose dealt with the relation of the individual to society, and the competing rights and obligations of both. Here we see the seeds of socialism being sown, especially in ideas of the benefits of association, common ownership and collective organization of the state.

Both democracy and capitalism took root in the fertile soil prepared by the dramatic shift in scientific, intellectual and philosophical thought during the Enlightenment. In turn, these developments nurtured a response in social critics who observed the concomitant rise of extreme poverty and other societal ills. With the rapid rise of modern industrial capitalism, socialism shed its utopian foundation and was transformed into a political doctrine in the 19th century. Anarchism distinguished itself from other currents of socialist thought with its theory of freedom, which accounts for human liberty in the context of nature, value and social conditions (Crowder, 1991) This is manifest in anarchism’s opposition to the state as the destroyer of freedom: redemption is achieved only in free and voluntary association. Marx considered anarchism a critical position with no practical application. For him the state is a transitional but necessary stage that anticipates a classless society. Marx locates human oppression in class struggle, which arises in the division of labour and characterizes all of history. Marx’s dialectical approach provides a framework in which to understand social change through contradiction and negation; indeed, his method of historical materialism produces an analysis of capitalism that implies an alternative mode of social organization. Marx’s notion of praxis is central for this exam, which considers generally the problem of social transformation: “The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.” (Marx, Theses on Feuerbach, No. XI). Agency is thus the key to emancipation.

Marx’s work inaugurated a new system of philosophical, political and economic thought, which sparked countless, and continuing, debates. Heirs to the Marxist legacy include Western Marxism, which emphasizes culture over economic analysis, and Critical Theory, which salvages the radical, emancipatory elements of Marxism. Capitalism as a source of repression (of human and nature) was a persistent focus for critique, while peace, freedom and happiness remained the inspiration for alternative visions of society. Key debates concerned the failure of the Enlightenment (particularly the technological basis of rationality), the viability of the revolutionary project, and the loss of the working class as an agent of change. New interpretations of Marxism continued to evolve out of the foundational tenets; by the mid-twentieth century, the material basis of analysis broadened, and other dynamics, such as gender and ethnicity, gained equal footing with class. Post-colonial theory customized a Marxian analysis to comprehend the devastation wrought by colonial rule, conceptualizing imperialism through the prism of class struggle.

The convergence of race, class and gender heralded a post-modern turn in radical social theory, and anchored theoretical approaches to “new social movements.” This exam considers such movements dialectically – as both products and creators of modernity and hence, social change. The post-Marxist approach contended that social inequality and unfreedom can no longer be reduced to considerations of class, and identified patriarchy, nationalism and racism as intersecting sources of oppression. Thus there was an insistence upon a reflexive relationship between the classic Marxist dualism of base and superstructure. Reinterpretations of Marxism flourished in light of the changing dynamics of capitalism in late modernity – especially technological advancement. Key Marxian concepts were rearticulated: power was decoupled from its material base, becoming decentralized and relativistic; praxis became pedagogical; and emancipation was no longer self-evident.

The loss of the revolutionary class caused a shift in radical social theory toward communication as a means to achieve liberation. Arguably, the development of communication theory imbricates with the evolution of socialist thought, culminating with Habermas’ (1981) concept of communicative reason. On this account, rationality is the cornerstone of both emancipation and domination. It is through the action of communicating that society operates and evolves; only when communication is free from domination and oriented toward mutual understanding is emancipation possible. Habermas relocates agency from its traditional class base to communicative action, which is both the instrument of progressive social change and the foundation for deliberative democracy. The transfer of agency from the working class to the citizen is also evident in the notion of the public sphere (Habermas, 1962/1989), that civic space between state power and private interests where rational-critical debate can occur among members of society on matters of public interest. The public sphere enhances and defends democracy by facilitating free speech and assembly and enabling organization against oppressive forms of social and political power. As the public sphere presupposes a free press, this concept has contributed much to theoretical debates in communication theory about the media’s role in social transformation, particularly in relation to democracy.

Communication is central to human interaction; it is the cornerstone of all social organization. The task for creating a society free from domination, where human needs are fulfilled and human wants are satisfied through self-empowered activity, lies before us. That it is a task that relies a new approach, one guided by holism, collectivity and sustainability, is clear. It is ours to first dream – and then communicate – this new approach. And after the dreaming, comes the doing.

For some reason, I felt I needed to know Habermas’ theory of communicative reason or communicative rationality. When I first read Habermas, back in my early masters days, I learned of his theoretical wranglings with Foucault, and how the German philosopher/sociologist had called the French philosopher/historian a Young Conservative.

According to Nancy Fraser (1985), “this epithet was an allusion to the ‘conservative revolutionaries’ of interwar Weimar Germany, a group of radical, antimodernist intellectuals…To call Foucault a ‘Young Conservative,’ then, was to accuse him of elaborating what Habermas calls a ‘total critique of modernity.’ Such a critique…is theoretically paradoxical because it cannot help but presuppose surreptitiously some of the very modern categories and attitudes it claims to have surpassed. And it is politically suspect because it aims less at a dialectical resolution of the problems of modern societies than at a radical rejection of modernity as such. In sum, it is Habermas’ (1981, 1982) contention that, although Foucaualt’s critique of contemporary culture and society purports to be postmodern, it is at best modern and at worst antimodern.”

When I told My Friend of Habermas’ critique of his beloved Foucault, his retort was, “Who? Haber-ass?”

I was all, good one.

Anyhoo, reading Theory of Communicative Action is the equivalent of chewing on cardboard, albeit more (mentally) nourishing but certainly not tasty, or easy to get down. What is with these German philosophers and their dry, dense writing style (Marx’s flourishes not withstanding)? Communicative reason is different from the rationalist tradition, which locates rationality in the structure of either the knowing subject, or the cosmos. Rather, Habermas grounds rationality in structures of interpersonal linguistic communication. As a social theory, this advances the goals of human emancipation as it maintains an inclusive universalist moral framework. Such a framework rests on universal pragmatics, the notion that speech acts have an inherent telos, that is, a purpose or determined end. “Reaching understanding is the inherent telos of speech” (287). He is assured that people have the ability, the communicative competence, to achieve such understanding. Habermas is concerned to carry the Enlightenment project forward, and seeks a more humane, just and egalitarian world by developing human potential for reason through discourse ethics.

Habermas distinguishes communicative rationality from its strategic counterpart (cmns oriented toward success); the former attempts to explain human rationality as the outcome of successful communication. He contextualizes reason in the everyday practices of modern individuals; he further examines the presuppositions and validity dimensions of everyday cmns, which in turn explain deep structures of reason, defending against relativism. He identifies three validity dimensions of communicative rationality. These “worlds” are: normative rightness, theoretical truth and expressive or subjective truthfulness. These validity claims must be criticizable; that is, the speaker is expected to be able to justify her statements, to give acceptable reasons for her position. Thus the hearer is rationally motivated to accept the conditions of the speech act, and ultimately, the content. Communication is successful only if there is agreement regarding the validity claims raised in the speech acts exchanged.

Through his formal-pragmatic analysis of cmns, Habermas has shown that rationality shouldn’t be limited to objective concerns – indeed, the very structure of cmns indicates that normative and evaluative concerns can and should be addressed rationally.

Easy.

So cliche, I know!

Foucault has been a pain in my ass since beginning graduate studies. I decided I need to get to know him better, to clear it all up, so I put him on my comps list. Not the least reason being his adamant, outspoken opposition to Marxism. It’s important to know the important critiques of whatever it is you’re studying. Also, there might just be something to what he’s saying … his notion of power certainly can be adapted to bolster or nuance other conceptualizations. We’ll see. Anyway, here’s my limited grasp of what Foucault was on about in his essay: The Subject and Power.

What is Foucault’s concept of power? He suggests we need new economy of power relations – one that is more empirical, implies more relations between theory and practice. The starting point is the forms of resistance against different forms of power; “it consists in using this resistance as a chemical catalyst so as to bring to light power relations, locate their position, find out their point of application and the methods used” (129). Instead of analyzing power relations from the perspective of power’s internal rationality, the new approach considers power relations through the antagonism of strategies. In other words, to understand power relations, Foucault suggests investigating forms of resistance and their attempts to subvert or alter these relations. These are not simply “anti-authority” struggles; their main objective is to attack a technique, a form of power (vs. attacking this or that institution of power, class etc.)

For Foucault power is inextricably linked to subjectivity. People become subjects in and through existing power relations. He offers two definitions of “subject”: 1. Subject to someone else by control and dependence; 2. Tied to one’s own identity by conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power that subjugates and makes subject to. Foucault casts the modern state as a sophisticated structure that integrates individuals on condition that this individuality would be shaped in a new form and submitted to a set of specific patterns. Precisely, the state is a modern matrix of individualization or new form of pastoral power, whose objective is salvation in this, not the next, world; “worldly” aims thus replace religious aims. The result is a political “double bind” – the simultaneous individualization and totalization of modern power structures. The problem of our day is therefore NOT to try to liberate the individual from the state and its institutions BUT to liberate us both from the state and the type of individualization linked to the state. In other words, we need to promote new forms of subjectivity through refusing this kind of individuality.

How is power exercised? Foucault distinguishes three types of power relationships. There is power that is exerted over things and gives the ability to modify, use, consume or destroy them [objective capacities]. There is power that brings into play relations between individuals [power relations]. Both of these are not to be confused with relationships of communication that transmit info (by means of a language, system of signs or other symbolic medium). The consequences and objectives of the production/circulation of communication can have results in realm of power [relationships of cmns]. These three types of relationships always overlap; they constitute “blocks” – regulated systems in which the adjustment of abilities, and resources of communication and power relations constitute “disciplines.” European societies have been increasingly disciplined since the 18th c. – this means that an increasingly controlled, more rational and economic process of adjustment has been sought between productive activities, cmns networks and the play of power relations. THUS, it is power relations, not power itself that is the object of analysis.

What constitutes the specificity of power relations? The exercise of power is “a way in which some act on others” (137). There is no such entity as power. Rather, power exists only as exercised by some on others – when it’s put into action. Power is not a matter of consent, not a renunciation of freedom, not the transfer of rights or power of each and all delegated to a few. A relationship of power is a mode of action that doesn’t act directly and immediately on others; instead it acts upon their action. It can only be articulated on the basis of two elements: 1. “the other” (the one over whom power is exercised) is recognized as a subject who acts; and 2. faced with a relationship of power, a whole field of responses, reactions etc. may open up.

The exercise of power is a management of possibilities; power is less a confrontation between two adversaries than a question of “government” – the way in which the conduct of individuals or groups might be directed (e.g. the government of children). “Government” is not just political structures or the management of states; it covers not only the legitimately constituted forms of political or economic subjection but also modes of action destined to act upon the possibilities of action of other people. To govern “is to structure the possible field of action of others.” The relationship to power is sought in that singular mode of action (neither warlike nor juridical) which is government. Power is exercised only over free subjects, those free to choose among several kinds of conduct etc. Power and freedom are not mutually exclusive facts – freedom is the condition for exercise of power (and its precondition and permanent support). The power relationship and freedom’s refusal to submit cannot be separated; at the heart of the power relationship are “the recalcitrance of the will and the intransigence of freedom” (139)

How to analyze the power relationship? Power relations are rooted deep in the social nexus, not a supplementary structure over and above “society,” which may be obliterated. The analysis of power relations is politically necessary to discover the conditions that are necessary to transform some, abolish others. Although there can’t be a society w/out power relations, it doesn’t mean the current ones are necessary or that power constitutes an inescapable fatality that can’t be undermined… Because power relations are rooted in the whole network of the social (and against Marxism) one can’t reduce power relations to study of institutions. They have been progressively governmentalized (e.g. come more under state control) – elaborated, rationalized and centralized in form of state institutions.

Foucault concludes by discussing the relationship between power relations and confrontation strategies. He basically states that at the heart of power relations (and as permanent condition of their existence) lies insubordination and obstinacy on the part of the principles of freedom. THUS there can be no relationship of power without means of escape. Every power relationship therefore implies (at least in potentia) a strategy of struggle; each implies for the other a certain limit, a point of possible reversal. A relationship of confrontation reaches its term (and the victory of one adversary) when stable mechanisms replace free play of antagonistic reactions (allowing for the direction of conduct of others).

“For a relationship of confrontation, from the moment it is not a struggle to the death, the fixing of a power relationship becomes a target – at one and the same time its fulfillment and its suspension. And, in return, the strategy of struggle also constitutes a frontier for the relationship of power, the line at which, instead of manipulating and inducing actions in a calculated manner, one must be content w/reaching to them after the event. It would not be possible for power relations to exist w/out points of insubordination that, by definition, are means to escape” (143).

Every strategy of confrontation dreams of becoming a relationship of power and every relationship of power tends to become a winning strategy. At every moment, the relationship of power may become a confrontation between two adversaries; the relationship between adversaries may at every moment put into operation mechanisms of power. For Foucault, then, domination is a general structure of power but it is also a strategic situation.